基于武器级铀的核弹头内部炸药的放射性核素分析

Radionuclide Analysis of Explosive in Nuclear Warhead with Weapons-grade Uranium

  • 摘要: 在军备控制核查技术领域,核弹头拆卸认证是重要的研究对象。本文分析了基于武器级铀的核弹头(即铀弹头)内部炸药的放射性核素的产生、种类和数目,旨在研究炸药中放射性核素的被动式探测法是否可用于铀弹头中拆卸出的炸药的来源鉴别。结果表明,在铀弹头内部炸药中,短寿命放射性核素(16N、15O、13N和11C)的数目太少(少于1个),因此在铀弹头拆卸后,无法通过探测这些短寿命放射性核素来实现炸药的来源鉴别。而对于存放时间超过30 a、内部结构遵从模型1(由Steve Fetter提出)的铀弹头,拆卸后炸药中的长寿命放射性核素(14C)可被检测出来,进而能为炸药的来源鉴别提供重要依据。

     

    Abstract: In the field of arms control verification techniques, the dismantlement authentication of nuclear warheads is an important research object. The production, category and number of the radionuclides of the explosives in the nuclear warheads with weapons-grade uranium cores (namely WgU warheads) were analyzed, aiming at studying whether the passive detection of the radionuclides of the explosives can be applicable for the source authentication of the explosives dismantled from the WgU warheads. Based on the research result, in the explosive of the WgU warhead, the number of the radionuclides with short lifetime (16N, 15O, 13N and 11C) is few (fewer than 1). As a result, it’s impossible to authenticate the source of the explosive by detecting these radionuclides with short lifetime after the dismantlement of the WgU warhead. However, for the WgU warhead with the storage time longer than 30 years and the inner structure based on the model 1 (proposed by Steve Fetter), the radionuclide with long lifetime (14C) in the explosive can be detected after the dismantlement of the WgU warhead, which can provide important evidence for the source authentication of the explosive.

     

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