安全壳非能动热阱系统研究

Research on Containment Passive Heat Sink System

  • 摘要: 为对国内具有自主知识产权的三代核电机组华龙一号进行持续优化研究,本文基于现有华龙一号非能动安全壳热量导出系统的配置,提出了一套全新的安全壳非能动热阱系统,用于执行设计基准事故下的安全壳热量导出功能。安全壳非能动热阱系统采用热容量大的冰作为非能动热阱,基于现有华龙一号的反应堆厂房布置,通过热量平衡计算,开展了冰室容量分析、冷水机组性能计算、安全壳非能动热阱系统应对设计基准事故的安全功能容量论证。计算结果表明:在现有非能动安全壳热量导出系统配套一定容量的冰后,安全壳非能动热阱系统能在24 h将安全壳的温度和压力控制在安全限值以内,确保安全壳的完整性。安全壳非能动热阱系统不依赖于动力电源,工艺系统简单,吸热效果显著,可有效提升应对设计基准事故的能力,同时可进一步简化现有华龙一号机组安全系统的配置,提升经济性。

     

    Abstract: The Gen Ⅲ nuclear power plant HPR1000 possesses domestic independent intellectual property rights. Aiming at the continuous optimization, improvement and innovation research of HPR1000, a new containment passive heat sink system which can transfer the containment heat under design basis accident conditions was proposed based on the existing passive containment cooling system configuration of HPR1000. This new system used ice with a large heat capacity as the passive heat sink. Based on the existing reactor building layout of HPR1000, the ice capacity was analyzed, the water chilling unit performance was calculated by heat balance calculation, and then the safety function capacity in response to design basis accident of the containment passive heat sink system was demonstrated. The temperature and pressure response of the containment under large LOCA conditions were simulated and analyzed in the following four cases: 1) case 1, the current configuration scheme of HPR1000 containment, the passive containment cooling system was not started; 2) case 2, the current configuration scheme of HPR1000 containment, the passive containment cooling system was started; 3) case 3, the containment passive heat sink system was configured, and the passive containment cooling system was not started; 4) case 4, the containment passive heat sink system was configured, and the passive containment cooling system was started. The results of case 1 and case 3 show that when the passive containment cooling system is not started, the containment would be eventual failure because of the containment heat cannot be smoothly exported to the outside of the containment. The current configuration scheme of HPR1000 fails to activate the passive containment cooling system at 14.85 h after the accident. After adopting the containment passive heat sink system, the containment pressure reaches 0.276 MPa (absolute pressure) 24 h after the accident, exceeding the limit requirement that the containment pressure after 24 h under the design basis condition should be less than half of the design pressure (i.e. 0.26 MPa (absolute pressure)), and the containment is damaged about 41.85 h after the accident. The comparison of case 1 and 3 shows that if the passive containment cooling system is not configured or started, the containment passive heat sink system can only delay the time of containment failure and cannot reduce the risk of containment overpressure. The results of case 2 show that, under the condition that the passive containment cooling system is activated, the containment pressure reaches 0.51 MPa (absolute pressure) 24 h after the accident, and the peak containment pressure reaches 0.519 8 MPa (absolute pressure) about 31.6 h after the accident, although it does not exceed the design pressure of the containment. However, it cannot meet the limit requirements for the design basis condition. The results of case 4 show that, through reasonable ice room design, the temperature and pressure of the containment can be controlled at a low level under the design basis condition. The containment pressure rises slowly from 0-75 h after the accident and reaches 0-194 MPa (absolute pressure) 24 h after the accident. With the continuous melting of the ice and continuous thermal conductivity of the passive containment cooling system, the peak pressure of 0.259 MPa (absolute pressure) reachs about 40.9 h after the accident, which is still less than half of the design pressure of the containment. Subsequently, with the continuous operation of the passive containment cooling system, the containment pressure slowly decreases, ensuring the integrity of the containment, while maintaining the internal temperature of about 110 ℃. The results of all cases show that the passive containment cooling system equipped with a certain ice capacity can control the temperature and pressure of the containment within the safety limit within 24 h to ensure the integrity of the containment. The containment passive heat sink system is independent of the power supply, the process system is simple, and the heat absorption effect is significant. It can effectively improve the ability of HPR1000 to deal with the design basis accident, further simplify the existing configuration of HPR1000, and improve the economy.

     

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